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INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff's brief in this matter contains the
assertion that the issues properly presented on appeal are
somehow constrained by terms of the findings and conclusions
entered by the court below.

Obviously, this is not the law or

the commission of error in entering findings and conclusions would
never be

reviewable.

Indeed, not only 4re these acts of trial

courts subject to review but, as has been previously noted by this
Court, the conclusions of law entered by a trial court are not
presumed to be correct and are not entitled to deference on
appeal.

Steele v. Breinholt,

P.2d

, 73 UAR 8 6 (Utah App.

1988).

Accordingly, this Court should rfeview the conclusions

of law entered in this action in light of the evidence actually
received to determine if they are supported by that evidence.
Furthermore, the trial court's interpretation of a
written contract is the determination of a question of law which
need not be deferred to an appeal.
P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986).

Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714

This Court is freet to, and should, interpret

the written option in issue without reference to the trial court's
erroneous conclusion concerning that document.
POINT I - THE PLAINTIFF NEVER ACQUIRED CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
CAPABLE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The plaintiff's attempts to remake history in this action
by suggesting that this case does not involve an option are
contrary to all the evidence and its own pleadings.

The present

action was initiated by a complaint which alleged that "[o]n or
about February 2, 1986, plaintiff and defendants entered into
an agreement whereby plaintiff obtained an option to purchase
certain property from defendants."

The complaint further alleged

that "despite plaintiff's substantial performance, [defendants]
refused to perform pursuant to the option agreement."
After becoming informed that the law does not recognize
the doctrine of substantial performance in reference to options,
the plaintiff then decided the option in question was not a "true"
option, whatever that means.
However, the option in question isnft confusing,
ambiguous or subject to conflicting interpretations.

While the

trial court entered a conclusion of law that the parties had an
agreement that was "the equivalent of an earnest money receipt
and offer to purchase which was accepted", this conclusion of
law, which is entitled to no deference in this Court, is totally
at odds with the evidence.
It is significant that plaintiff was unable to cite to
any testimony or any exhibit which supposedly provides the basis
in fact for this conclusion of law.

The documents signed by

the defendants expressly refer to an option granted to plaintiff.
Plaintiff unequivocally admitted he failed to exercise the option.
While it is undoubtedly true that the trial court
believed that plaintiff made a stupid mistake through ignorance,
this fact provides no basis for "reforming" his agreement with
the defendants into the type of agreement he could have, but did
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not, make for himself.
POINT II - A RECOVERY IN QUANTUM MERUIT REQUIRES A FINDING OF
OF SOME ACT BY THE DEFENDANTS JUSTIFYING RELIEF.
During the option period plaintiflf agreed with Tracy
Collins to pay off a note which Tracy Colllins held, which note
was secured by a deed of trust against the property.

Plaintiff

admits that the defendants did not request that it make this
payment.

However/ plaintiff contends that it was obligated to

make the payment by virtue of the "agreement" entered into with
the Roberts.

However, the "agreement" referred to is the contract

which never came into existence because plaintiff failed to
exercise its option to make that agreement binding upon the
Roberts.
While there is no question that the Roberts were
benefited by this payment/ the mere fact that they were enriched
does not provide a basis for relief in equity.

As the Utah

Supreme Court noted in Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings/ Inc. v.
Adams/ 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977):
The mere fact that a third person
benefits from a contract between
two others does not make such third
person liable in quasi-contract,
unjust enrichment, or restitution.
There must be some misleading act,
request for services/ or the tike/
to support such an action.
564 P.2d at 774.

See also. Knight v. Post/

32 (Utah App. 1988).
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P.2d

, 74 UAR

Although the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon defendants
while undoubtedly laboring under a unilateral mistake regarding
its legal rights, there was no conduct by the defendants which
justifies imposing the equitable remedy of restitution.
POINT III - THIS APPEAL IS NOT MOOT.
The controversy between the parties in this action has
not been eliminated.

The central controversy involves who is

rightfully entitled to ownership of the home.

The Roberts have

taken every action possible, short of contempt of Court, to
preserve this central question for appellate resolution.

They

have filed motions for new trial and for stay of exec ution in
the trial court;

they promptly appealed and moved for stay of

execution in this court.

They sought protection in the Bankruptcy

Court and they have not accepted any benefit conferred upon them
by the judgment.

All of these actions are entirely inconsistent

with the notion that they have "agreed" to the judgment entered
below.
As has been previously noted, the general rule relating
to the mootness of an appeal is that
[w]here a party acts under compulsion
of and in accordance with a judgment
order from which an appeal is then
taken, there has been no waiver of the
appeal or release of errors, the
issue is not moot and the party is not
estopped from prosecuting the appeal.
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Les Michude & Son Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 97 111. App.
3d. 340, 422 N.E. 2d 1078 (1981).
Plaintiff does not point to any purported act of the
defendants as an expression of an "agreement" with the judgment
below, but rather asserts only that the failure of parties,
who are admittedly bankruptcy, to post an $8 5,000 bond should
preclude consideration of their appeal on t}he merits.

Any such

interpretation of Utah law would be violative of the Utah
Constitution's Open Courts provision, Art. L §11, and the due
process and equal protection clauses of thel Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
Texaco, Inc.,

U.S.

See, generally, Pennzoil Co. v.

,107 S.Ct. 1519 (19B7).

As defendants are entitled to a review of their claims
on the merits, without regard to their impefcuniosity, this Court
should reject the suggestion of mootness.
CONCLUSION
Each of the arguments advanced in $upport of the judgment
entered below requires a finding of the existence of a bilateral
contract, which contract never came into being by virtue of the
failure of the plaintiff to exercise its option.

The belief that

the plaintiff would have exercised its option had it been properly
cognizant of the law does not provide any lqgal justification for
plaintiff's failure to do so.

Accordingly, the judgment entered

below should be reversed and this matter remanded with instructions to
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enter

judgment against the plaintiff, no cause of action,
DATED this

day of February, 1988.

M. David Eckersley
Attorney for Appellants
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